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A Trade-off That Becomes a Rip-off: When Schools 
Can’t Regulate Cyberbullying 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a place in America where groups of citizens are confined 
and allowed few constitutional rights. No citizen may possess a firearm,1 
and carrying any other weapon results in serious penalties.2 No one is 
allowed to freely practice religion,3 nor engage in political protests.4 
Forget freedom of the press; anything the state finds contrary to its 
“mission” will be suppressed.5 “Reasonable” searches, including strip 
searches, may be performed without probable cause or a warrant.6 The 
institution governing these citizens can make its own rules and 
regulations,7 and the only due process available for most infractions 
consists merely of notice.8 Even the kinds of clothing allowed are 
regulated by the state,9 and if citizens object, they have little power to 
effect a change because most of them cannot even vote.10 
 
 1. 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (2012). 
 2. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.280 (2009) (making possession of firearms and 
any other weapon at school a gross misdemeanor and grounds for expulsion). 
 3. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962) (prohibiting sponsoring 
voluntary daily prayer and Bible reading); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 38 (1985) 
(prohibiting voluntary silent prayer). 
 4. See, e.g., Madrid v. Anthony, 510 F. Supp. 2d 425, 425 (S.D. Tex. 2007) 
(prohibiting students attending protest); Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 168 F. Supp. 2d 332, 
332–333 (M.D. Pa. 2001) (upholding prohibition of student circulated petitions). But see 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969) (allowing armbands 
worn to protest the Vietnam War). 
 5. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 260 (1988) (upholding 
regulation of school newspapers). 
 6. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist., v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 364 (2009); New Jersey v. 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 325 (1985). 
 7. See, e.g., Price v. N.Y. City Bd. of Educ., 855 N.Y.S.2d 530, 540 (App. Div. 2008) 
(holding rule banning cell phones in schools was not arbitrary and capricious). 
 8. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 565 (1975) (finding due process afforded for short 
term suspensions). 
 9. Blau ex rel. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 381–82, 385–86 
(6th Cir. 2005) (upholding dress code that prohibited baggy or revealing clothing; visible 
body piercings; clothing with holes; flip flop sandals or platform shoes; bottoms that are not 
solid navy, black, khaki, or white; and tops that are not a solid color, have writing on them or 
have logos except the school’s logo that are larger than the size of a quarter). 
 10. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1 (establishing legal voting age of 18). 
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Ironically, most Americans have not only spent at least thirteen 
years in such a state-sponsored institution,11 but have also committed 
vast resources to maintain it.12 Most of these formerly oppressed 
citizens not only have fond memories of their time in this 
institution13 but also report high satisfaction14 in sending their own 
children to this seeming “enclave[] of totalitarianism.”15 This 
“totalitarian” institution, almost entirely supported by state and local 
taxes,16 is the U.S. public education system. 
The public trades some of its most cherished individual rights to 
schools who provide benefits to both the children served and 
society,17 including an environment where schools can inculcate the 
“values of citizenship that will enable students to participate 
effectively in the nation’s economic practices and democratic 
institutions when they become adults.”18 However, if students trade 
some rights, but students’ and parents’ expectations of civility,19 
 
 11. NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PROJECTIONS OF EDUCATIONAL 
STATISTICS TO 2021 (2013), available at 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/projections/projections2021/tables/table_01.asp (finding 
that in 2010, 92% of American children in grades 9-12 were enrolled in a public school). 
 12. Background Analysis, Federal Education Budget Project, NEW AMERICA FOUND., 
Jun. 30, 2013 [hereinafter Education Budget], available at 
http://febp.newamerica.net/background-analysis/school-finance (“America spends over $500 
billion a year on public elementary and secondary education in the United States.”). 
 13. Jennifer Senior, Why You Truly Never Leave High School, N.Y. MAGAZINE (Jan. 20, 
2013), available at http://nymag.com/news/features/high-school-2013-1/ (“[F]or most of 
us adults, the adolescent years [in high school] occupy a privileged place in our 
memories . . . .”). 
 14. Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Private Schools Get Top Marks for Educating Children, 
GALLUP POLITICS (Aug. 29, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/156974/private-schools-
top-marks-educating-children.aspx (finding that in 2012, 75% of parents reported being 
satisfied with the quality of education their oldest child was receiving in public school). 
 15. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
 16. Education Budget, supra note 12 (finding that typically almost 90% of elementary 
and secondary education funding is from state and local taxes). 
 17. Emily Buss, Constitutional Fidelity Through Children’s Rights, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 
355, 361 (2004) (“Schools serve as one of the primary sites for positive influence, for the 
development of basic intellectual skills, the acquisition of knowledge, and the cultivation of 
prosocial behavior. To accomplish all this, schools need a level of control that may justify a 
diminution of rights.”). 
 18. ANNE PROFFITT DUPRE, SPEAKING UP: THE UNINTENDED COSTS OF FREE SPEECH 
IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 9 (2009). 
 19. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 
1979) (Newman, J., concurring) (“With its captive audience of children, many of whom, along 
with their parents, legitimately expect reasonable regulation, a school need not capitulate to a 
student’s preference for vulgar expression.”) (emphasis added). 
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order, and security in schools are not realized, they may see this 
trade-off as a rip-off. Students and parents who feel cheated by the 
schools create significant concerns, including contributing to an 
overall lack of faith in the U.S. public education system.20 
One aspect of this trade-off that is a potential rip-off arises in the 
arena of cyberbullying. Schools have traditionally required students 
to trade some of their First Amendment free speech rights for 
protection from the negative effects of other students’ unregulated 
speech. Unfortunately, current school speech precedent applied to 
cyberbullying often leaves schools unable to discipline cyberbullies. 
Accordingly, students and parents can feel ripped-off when, after 
surrendering some free speech rights in the name of a safe and 
orderly education system, schools are still unable to provide 
protection from cyberbullies. This Comment joins other 
commentators in arguing that relying on the second prong of the 
Tinker test,21 as has been explored by some lower courts, would 
allow schools to consistently discipline harmful student speech no 
matter where it originates. Such an application of Tinker allows 
schools to uphold their end of the school speech trade-off. 
This Comment also breaks new ground arguing that using 
Tinker’s second prong is consistent with current school speech 
doctrine trade-offs and with Tinker’s history, text, and interpretation 
by subsequent Supreme Court cases. Part II explains that the trading 
of constitutional rights for benefits is commonplace and beneficial in 
schools and society. Part III discusses how one such trade-off—
embodied by the school speech doctrine—has changed over time, 
requiring more of students in exchange for the promised benefits of 
public schooling. Part IV shows that in spite of this expansion of 
restrictions in school speech doctrine, courts currently construe the 
doctrine too rigidly in cyberbullying cases, thus creating an unfair 
bargain for schools and families. Finally, Part V argues that courts 
 
 20. Jones, supra note 14. Although parents are generally satisfied with the quality of 
education their own children receive in public school, this satisfaction has declined 5% over the 
last two years. Id. Also, Americans in general have an increasing low opinion of public schools. 
Id. In 2012, only 37% of Americans believed public school provided a “good” or “excellent” 
education, and every year since 2004, less than half of Americans have reported being 
“satisfied” with the quality of public education in the United States. Id. 
 21. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969) 
(outlining a two-prong test to determine if a school could regulate student speech: (1) if the 
student’s speech substantially disrupts the school, or (2) if the speech invades the rights of 
others to be secure and left alone). 
DO NOT DELETE 1/30/2014 2:39 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
1648 
should use Tinker’s second prong to consider the “rights of others” 
when determining if a student’s cyberbullying speech is protected. 
This approach would ensure that students who shed many of their 
rights “at the schoolhouse gate”22 do not find the school’s promise 
of order and security empty. 
II. TRADING RIGHTS 
Historically, schools were not required to recognize students’ 
individual rights.23 Today, public school students do not absolutely 
shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate; however, 
students’ at-school rights are not as extensive as their out-of-school 
rights24 nor “coextensive with the rights of adults.”25 In schools, 
students do not have the full rights of expression;26 a full liberty 
interest (because of compulsory attendance requirements);27 or 
unqualified rights under the Fourth28 or Eighth Amendments;29 In 
addition, schools can restrict the promotion of drugs30 and the use of 
threatening,31 vulgar, or obscene language.32 Trading these rights 
furthers the state and community’s interest in educating students by 
allowing schools to provide students with order and security that 
they may not receive in any other setting. Students also receive other 
 
 22. Id. at 506. 
 23. See DUPRE, supra note 18, at 10 (“Courts . . . allowed school officials the same 
power to make rules regarding student conduct at school as the parent would have at home—
that is, virtually without limit . . . .”). 
 24. See infra notes 26–32. 
 25. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
 26. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 686–87 (restricting vulgar or obscene speech); Morse, 551 U.S. 
at 393 (restricting speech promoting drug use); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 
260, 260 (1988) (restricting school-sponsored speech); Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503 (restricting all 
other disruptive speech). 
 27. Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925). 
 28. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 460 U.S. 325, 327 (1985) (holding that searches of students 
only need be reasonable); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 646 (1995); Bd. of 
Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822 (2002) (allowing random urinalysis drug testing of 
students). 
 29. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 651 (1977) (finding that corporal punishment 
is not cruel and unusual punishment). 
 30. Morse, 551 U.S. at 393. 
 31. Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2007). 
 32. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686–87 (1986). 
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benefits that are not necessarily available to them outside of school; 
schools provide extra protection to students from physical and 
psychological harm through interactions with school staff, who, for 
example, must report suspected child abuse33 and keep potentially 
damaging student records confidential.34 
The concept of trading rights is not unique to the school setting. 
In many contexts, Americans expect to give up some of their 
constitutional rights in order to gain benefits. For example, to 
decrease gun violence, Americans have traded a portion of their 
Second Amendment right to bear arms by passing laws that restrict 
the sale of firearms to certain individuals.35 Likewise, some Fourth 
Amendment rights related to privacy are traded to allow police the 
latitude to more effectively fight crime,36 and employers to discover 
employee misconduct.37 Also, First Amendment rights are routinely 
abridged in the workplace to allow employers to control what 
messages they sponsor,38 or to keep the peace in public places.39 
III. UPPING THE ANTE: INCREASING TRADE-OFFS IN SCHOOL 
SPEECH 
Trading rights in schools benefits not only individual citizens, 
but society as a whole. “The state (in the form of the public school) 
takes away some liberty from the individual student in order to 
 
 33. VICTORIA J. DODD, PRACTICAL EDUCATION LAW FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST 
CENTURY 284 (2d ed. 2010) (“All states require in some manner that school personnel report 
instances of suspected child abuse.”). 
 34. 20 U.S.C § 1232g (2012). 
 35. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d) (2012) (restricting the sale of firearms to, among others, 
convicted felons, fugitives, drug addicts, “mental[ly] defective[s],” illegal aliens, dishonorably 
discharged soldiers, and stalkers). 
 36. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (allowing warrantless entry to prevent 
destruction of evidence). 
 37. City of Ontario, Cal. v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2630 (2011) (holding a 
government employer’s warrantless search is reasonable “when conducted for a 
‘noninvestigatory work-related purpos[e]’ or for the ‘investigatio[n] of work-related 
misconduct’”). 
 38. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (holding that “when public 
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, [they] are not speaking as citizens 
for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications 
from employer discipline”). 
 39. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
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preserve the liberty of a nation.”40 The history of school speech 
explored in this Part illustrates that, inherent in the school speech 
trade-off, is the fact that as it becomes more difficult for schools to 
provide an orderly and secure environment, students are required to 
trade more rights.  
Before Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District,41 freedom of speech was not recognized meaningfully in 
public schools.42 This changed in 1965, when several students who 
wore black armbands to school to protest the Vietnam War were 
suspended when they refused to remove them.43 Although the 
district court found that the school’s action was “reasonable because 
it was based upon their fear of a disturbance,”44 the Supreme Court 
disagreed, reasoning that “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression.”45 Students therefore had a right to wear armbands to 
school even if the school disapproved. 
The Court limited this newly recognized right to student speech 
in what has come to be known as the two-prong Tinker test:46 
“conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which . . . involves 
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others”47 was not 
 
 40. DUPRE, supra note 18, at 2 (explaining that schools have the “important mission of 
educating each generation of new citizens so they will have the tools necessary to preserve and 
protect those tenets of democracy upon which the United States was founded”). 
 41. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 42. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 416 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Tinker 
effected a sea change in students’ speech rights, extending them well beyond traditional 
bounds.”); Kristi L. Bowman, The Civil Rights Roots of Tinker’s Disruption Tests, 58 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1129, 1130 (2009) (“Tinker was quite a departure from what came before it; prior to 
Tinker, it was not a foregone conclusion that students had any affirmative speech rights in 
public schools.”); Dan L. Johnston, The First Amendment and Education—A Plea for Peaceful 
Coexistence, 17 VILL. L. REV., 1023, 1025 (1972) (Before Tinker, most school administrators 
felt that they had “absolute authority to decide what would or would not go on within the 
school system during school hours, and that the Bill of Rights and the [F]irst [A]mendment 
did not apply to the school situation.”). 
 43. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
 44. Id. at 508. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Mary Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
1027, 1042 (2008) (“Although virtually all the student speech cases applying Tinker have 
focused on its material-and-substantial disruption prong, it is possible that the alternative 
prong of Tinker—interference with the rights of others—will become more important 
particularly in the context of harassing or demeaning speech.”). 
 47. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
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constitutionally protected. According to this test, student speech 
could still be regulated by schools if the speech 1) caused substantial 
disorder to the school, or 2) invaded the rights of others. At the 
time, it may have seemed that the Tinker school speech standard was 
sufficient to “prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”48 
However, times changed, and the Court came to see how the 
“whims and caprices of the[] loudest-mouthed”49 students created 
harmful student speech that survived the Tinker test. Consequently, 
over time, the Court added additional limitations to the student 
speech doctrine requiring students to trade additional speech rights 
to schools. 
The first major addition to the doctrine came twenty years after 
Tinker in Bethel School District v. Fraser, when a student gave a 
student body nominating speech that contained an “explicit sexual 
metaphor.”50 In response, the Supreme Court held that vulgar 
student speech should not be given the same protection as adult 
speech, even if the school could not have restricted it under Tinker.51 
The Court reasoned that, in addition to curtailing speech that 
“intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights of other 
students,”52 schools should also be able to “inculcate the habits and 
manners of civility” and “teach[] students the boundaries of socially 
appropriate behavior.”53 
Two years later, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, a 
school principal prevented the publication of two student-authored 
articles in a school newspaper because he feared the articles might 
invade the privacy of students and expose younger students to age-
inappropriate content.54 The Court discussed Tinker and determined 
that, if “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns,”55 a 
 
 48. Id. at 507. 
 49. Id. at 525 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 50. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 678 (1986). 
 51. Id. at 682 (“[T]he First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right 
to wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.”) (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 
Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1057 (2d Cir. 1979) (Fisher, J., concurring)). 
 52. Id. at 680. 
 53. Id. at 681 (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 228 (1968)). 
 54. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 263 (1988) (withholding from 
publication articles featuring current students discussing their parents’ divorces and another 
featuring three students’ experiences with pregnancy). 
 55. Id. at 273. 
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school may “disassociate itself not only from speech that would 
substantially interfere with its work . . . or impinge upon the rights 
of other students, but also from speech that is, for example, 
ungrammatical . . . biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or 
unsuitable for immature audiences.”56 Accordingly, after Kuhlmeier, 
schools were able to further regulate student speech, to better 
“[fulfill] their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the 
[student] to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional 
training, and in helping him adjust normally to his environment.’”57 
In 2007, recognizing the increasingly “difficult” yet “vitally 
important” job that school administrators face,58 the Supreme Court 
once more required students to forgo additional speech rights. 
During school, students in Juneau, Alaska, were allowed to walk 
across the street from their high school to watch the 2002 Olympic 
Torch Relay. While waiting for the torch, several students unfurled a 
banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS.”59 The banner’s creator 
refused to drop the banner and follow the principal to her office. He 
was later suspended.60 In Morse v. Frederick, the Court held that the 
student’s speech was not protected because the government had a 
compelling interest in preventing illegal drug use.61 Even the dissent 
agreed that, in light of the mission of schools, “it might well be 
appropriate to tolerate some targeted viewpoint discrimination in 
this unique setting.”62 
As Fraser and Kuhlmeier were interpreted by lower courts, 
schools continued to gain broad latitude in regulating on-campus 
student speech. Although Fraser concerned sexually explicit speech, 
the Fraser language relating to the promotion of civility has been 
applied broadly to include upholding punishments for a student 
swearing within earshot of a school secretary,63 or at another student 
in the cafeteria,64 or refusing to put away a small Confederate flag.65 
Fraser has also been used to uphold dress codes that banned T-shirts 
 
 56. Id. at 271 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 57. Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)). 
 58. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 409 (2007). 
 59. Id. at 397. 
 60. DUPRE, supra note 18, at 233. 
 61. Morse, 551 U.S. at 410. 
 62. Id. at 409. 
 63. Anderson v. Milbank Sch. Dist. 25-4, 197 F.R.D. 682 (D.S.D. 2000). 
 64. Heller v. Hodgin, 928 F. Supp. 789 (S.D. Ind. 1996). 
 65. Scott v. Sch. Bd., 324 F.3d 1246 (11th Cir. 2003). 
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with sexual innuendo,66 those that cast the school’s administration in 
a negative light,67 and those that “promote[d] destructive conduct 
and demoralizing values.”68 Kuhlmeier has also been broadly applied 
to other extracurricular activities such as protecting an 
administrator’s choice to change the school’s mascot,69 disciplining a 
student who gave a candidate’s speech that was “in bad taste,”70 and 
allowing the school to remove material a student repeatedly posted 
in her workspace that offended classmates.71 
Although this broad authority concerns some scholars,72 when 
schools have encroached impermissibly upon the core speech rights 
of students, courts have stepped in to keep schools in check. For 
instance, the Ninth Circuit ruled against a school when it attempted 
to use Hazelwood to ban anti-draft advertisements in a school paper, 
although it allowed advertisements from military recruiters;73 and a 
Michigan federal district court ruled against a school when it 
attempted to censor a student article on a pending lawsuit against 
the school district because the superintendent disagreed with the 
student’s views.74 
It could be argued that Morse has a very narrow application to 
only student speech that refers to illegal drugs, and some courts have 
applied it accordingly.75 However, like Fraser and Kuhlmeier, it too 
has gradually been applied broadly to other types of speech when 
courts feel that doing so helps schools “protect those entrusted to 
 
 66. Pyle ex rel. Pyle v. S. Hadley Sch. Comm., 861 F. Supp. 157, 158–59 (D. Mass. 
1994) (applying school dress code to T-shirt slogans including: “See Dick Drink. See Dick 
Drive. See Dick Die. Don’t be a Dick” and “Coed Naked Band: Do It to the Rhythm.”). 
 67. Gano v. Sch. Dist. No. 411, 674 F. Supp. 796, 797 (D. Idaho 1987) (denying 
student’s request to wear a shirt depicting three school administrators with alcoholic beverages 
acting drunk). 
 68. Boroff v. Van Wert City Bd. of Educ., 220 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir. 2000) 
(upholding prohibition of Marilyn Manson T-shirts). 
 69. Crosby ex rel. Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988) (upholding 
the change of mascot “Johnny Reb” because it offended black students). 
 70. Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 759–62 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding that “[t]he 
universe of legitimate pedagogical concerns is by no means confined to the academic”). 
 71. Fister v. Minn. New Country Sch., 149 F.3d 1187 (D. Minn. 1998). 
 72. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights 
at the Schoolhouse Gates: What’s Left of Tinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527 (2000). 
 73. San Diego Comm. Against Registration & the Draft v. Governing Bd., 790 F.2d 
1471, 1478 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 74. Dean ex rel. Elsarelli v. Utica Cmty. Schs., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 803 (E.D. Mich. 
2004). 
 75. DeFabio v. E. Hampton Union Free Sch. Dist., 623 F.3d 71, 77 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(“Speech that can ‘reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use’ may be restricted by 
school administrators.”). 
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their care.”76 Since one rationale for the holding of Morse was to 
avoid the “severe and permanent damage to the health and well-
being of young people,”77 Morse has been used to support the 
punishment of speech promoting other kinds of actions that may 
affect the health and well-being of students, including threats of 
school violence,78 speech promoting illegal behavior,79 and speech 
promoting racial conflict.80 
Under the current school speech doctrine, schools expect to be 
able to regulate speech that is potentially disruptive, lewd or vulgar, 
or dangerous in exchange for the benefits of public education they 
provide. Similarly, parents and students accept these regulations and 
make these concessions because they expect doing so will allow 
schools both to protect students from harm and to facilitate a 
positive learning environment. 
IV. THE CYBERBULLY RIP-OFF 
In 1968, the Tinker Court could not have imagined the avenues 
for student speech that currently create serious challenges for today’s 
schools. Back then, teens watched the Monkees or Star Trek81 on 
black-and-white televisions.82 Today’s teens can watch Vampire 
Diaries or American Idol83 at any location via the Internet84 on their 
 
 76. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007). 
 77. Id. at 407. 
 78. Boim v. Fulton Cnty. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting 
Morse, 551 U.S. at 408) (reasoning that just as Morse restricted student speech “‘that they 
reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use,’” so too a court should permit schools to 
restrict student speech “reasonably construed as a threat of school violence”). 
 79. Miller ex rel. Miller v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 588 F. Supp. 2d 606, 623 (E.D. Pa. 
2008). 
 80. Defoe ex rel. Defoe v. Spiva, 625 F.3d 324, 339 (6th Cir. 2010) (“If we substitute 
‘racial conflict’ for ‘drug abuse,’ the analysis in Morse is practically on all fours with this case.”). 
 81. 1968 TV Shows, TV PARTY, http://www.tvparty.com/fall68.html (last visited Jan. 
16, 2014). 
 82. Richard Powelson, First Color Television Sets Were Sold 50 Years Ago, POST 
GAZETTE.COM (Dec. 31, 2003), http://old.post-
gazette.com/tv/20031231colortv1231p3.asp (stating that many Americans did not enjoy 
color television until the late 1960s when set prices dropped and more programs were available 
in color). 
 83. Laurel Brown, 2012 Teen Choice Awards Nominees: ‘Vampire Diaries,’ ‘Idol’ and 
Bieber Score Big, BUDDY TV (May 18, 2012), http://www.buddytv.com/articles/the-
vampire-diaries/check-out-the-first-round-of-t-45748.aspx. 
 84. See Amanda Lenhart et al., Social Media and Young Adults, PEW INTERNET (Feb. 3, 
2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2010/Social-Media-and-Young-Adults.aspx 
(stating that 73% of teenagers ages 12–17 access content on the internet). 
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smart phones or laptops.85 This proliferation of technology has given 
the age-old problem of bullying a high-tech platform. 
In August 2010, the U.S. Department of Education held its first 
federal bullying prevention summit. At the summit, Secretary of 
Education, Arne Duncan, stated that “bullying is very much an 
education priority that goes to the heart of school performance and 
school culture,” and “[c]yber-bullying . . . is a new and especially 
insidious form of bullying.”86 Cyberbullying “refers to any kind of 
harassment that takes place on the Internet or over text messaging,” 
and is usually perpetrated by students against their peers.87 Recent 
research also recognizes the growing problem of teacher 
victimization by students,88 including the cyberbullying of teachers.89 
Cyberbullies can threaten anonymously,90 incessantly, and often 
with impunity.91 The negative effects92 on the victims of 
cyberbullying may be even stronger than traditional bullying because 
it is so pervasive. Victims cannot physically escape cyberbullies93 and 
 
 85. Amanda Lenhart, Teens, Smartphones & Texting, PEW INTERNET 3, 27 (Mar. 19, 
2012), available at 
http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Teens_ 
Smartphones_and_Texting.pdf (stating that 23% of all teens ages 12–17 have a smartphone, 
31% of teens ages 14–17 have a smartphone and 74% of all teens ages 12–17 own a desktop or 
laptop computer). 
 86. Arne Duncan, Sec’y of Educ., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Keynote Address at the Federal 
Partners in Bullying Prevention Summit: The Myths About Bullying (Aug. 11, 2010), 
available at http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/myths-about-bullying-secretary-arne-
duncans-remarks-bullying-prevention-summit. 
 87. Mary Kingston, Board Member Testifies at Cyber Safety Hearing, EDUC. DIGEST, 
Jan. 2011, at 10. 
 88. Dorothy Espelage et al., Understanding and Preventing Violence Directed Against 
Teachers, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST, Feb.–Mar. 2013, at 75. 
 89. Teemu Kauppi & Maili Pörhölä, School Teachers Bullied by Their Students: Teachers’ 
Attributions and How They Share Their Experiences, 28 TEACHING AND TCHR. EDUC. 1059, 
1060 (2012). 
 90. Robert S. Tokunaga, Following You Home from School: A Critical Review and 
Synthesis of Research on Cyberbullying Victimization, COMPUTERS IN HUM. BEHAV. 277, 279 
(explaining that because of the anonymity offered through electronic media, cyberbullying is 
an “opportunistic offense” where “[s]tudents who would not otherwise engage in traditional 
bullying behaviors do so online”). 
 91. Id. (“Instructors or school administrators are seen as agents of enforcement in 
traditional bullying. In cyberbullying, however, there is no clear individual or groups who serve 
to regulate deviant behaviors on the Internet.”). 
 92. Id. at 277 (“Victims of cyberbullying have lower self-esteem, higher levels of 
depression, and experience significant life challenges.”). 
 93. Id. at 279 (“Victims can be reached through their cellular phones, e-mail, and 
instant messengers at any given time of the day.”). 
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cyberbullies can “victimize a greater number of targets in front of a 
larger audience without significant risk.”94 The practice takes on a 
heightened “measure of mean-spiritedness . . . [b]ecause technology 
provides a screen behind which young people may hide” where they 
do not “have to be accountable for their actions.”95 This anonymity 
not only “emboldens” the perpetrators, it also “increases the fear 
factor for the victim.”96 This disinhibition creates a sense of 
invincibility where “[i]ndividuals who might otherwise be afraid to 
engage in bullying behavior . . . are more willing to do so.”97 
Perhaps this is why the gender pattern of cyberbullying is “the 
opposite of what happens off-line.”98 Face-to-face, boys tend to be 
the school bullies, whereas “online, girls are the major players.”99 
Because much student electronic speech originates off-campus, 
courts first hesitated to classify it as school speech.100 Some 
scholars101 still feel that “a child engaging in otherwise protected 
expression off campus and from a non-school-owned computer 
would seem to have a solid First Amendment right to engage in such 
expression.”102 However, a number of district and circuit courts have 
determined that “off-campus speech that subsequently is brought to 
campus or to the attention of school authorities [is subject to] the 
substantial disruption test from Tinker without regard to the 
location where the speech originated.”103 Unfortunately, because of 
the covert nature of cyberbullying, its effects often do not qualify as a 
 
 94. John Snakenborg, et al., Cyberbullying: Prevention and Intervention to Protect Our 
Children and Youth, 55 PREVENTING SCH. FAILURE 88, 90 (2011). 
 95. Andrew V. Beale & Kimberly R. Hall, Cyberbullying: What School Administrators 
(and Parents) Can Do, 81 THE CLEARING HOUSE, Sept.–Oct. 2007, at 8. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Snakenborg et al., supra note 94, at 90. 
 98. Beale & Hall, supra note 95, at 8. 
 99. Id. 
  100. E.g., Emmett v. Kent School District, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wash. 
2000). 
 101. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 395 (2011) (arguing that Tinker does not apply to student speech that is 
outside the supervision of the school); Papandrea, supra note 46, at, 1094–95 (“[P]unish[ing] 
students for any digital expression that harasses or bullies . . . pose[s] a grave threat to juvenile 
speech rights.”). 
 102. Christine Metteer Lorillard, When Children’s Rights “Collide”: Free Speech vs. The 
Right to be Left Alone in the Context of Off-Campus “Cyber-bullying,” 81 MISS. L.J. 189, 196 (2011). 
 103. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1103 
(C.D. Cal. 2010). 
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substantial disruption under Tinker. Even in situations where great 
disruption occurs to one teacher, administrator, or student,104 and 
could spread to others if unchecked, courts have hesitated to find 
substantial disruption to the work of the school as a whole.105 
In Layshock v. Hermitage School District, a high school senior 
created a vulgar MySpace “parody profile” of his principal, off-
campus during non-school hours, that characterized the principal as 
a marijuana-smoking, promiscuous alcoholic.106 Later, he accessed 
the profile at school and showed it to other students.107 Although 
three other students, in efforts to “one-up” each other, posted their 
own profiles, which were more “vulgar and more offensive”108 than 
the first, and the school district had to limit students’ access to the 
internet and cancel the computer programming classes for a week,109 
the court’s en banc panel determined, under Tinker, that there was 
no “foreseeable and substantial disruption of school,” and the 
student’s speech was protected.110 
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District was decided the same day as 
Layshock by the same Third Circuit panel. Perhaps unsurprisingly, in 
J.S., the panel reached the same conclusion as in Layshock.111 An 
eighth-grader and her friend created a vulgar MySpace profile of her 
school principal on her home computer.112 The profile used graphic 
language to portray the principal as a bisexual, child-molesting sex 
addict.113 The school district argued that the profile disrupted school 
because students were discussing the profile in class and staff had to 
 
 104. Thomas E. Wheeler, Lessons From Lord of the Flies: The Responsibility of Schools to 
Protect Students From Internet Threats and Cyber-Hate Speech, 215 EDUC. L. REP. 227, 241 
(2007) (discussing the problem of “off-campus speech that has the practical effect of 
precluding only one or a few students from receiving the benefits of a public education because 
of the nature of that speech”). 
 105. J.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1121 (holding that “no reasonable fact finder could 
conclude that the YouTube video [that the student posted harassing a fellow student] was 
reasonably likely to cause . . . substantial disruption”). 
 106. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 207 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 107. Id. at 209. 
 108. Id. at 208. 
 109. Id. at 209. 
 110. Id. at 219. 
 111. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d. 915, 933 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 112. Id. at 920. 
 113. Id. at 920–21. The profile professed that the principal’s interests included hitting on 
students and their parents, having “any kind” of sex in his office, and “riding the fraintrain”—a 
reference to the principal’s wife and counselor at the school, Deborah Frain. Id. at 921, 941. 
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be reassigned to deal with the two students.114 In the deeply divided 
en banc decision, the court again concluded that, under Tinker, no 
substantial disruption occurred and J.S.’s Internet speech was 
protected.115 
The decisions in Layshock and J.S. are a rip-off to students and 
parents because the bullying of school staff affects the ability of a 
school to provide a quality education. The principal in Layshock 
found the profile degrading, demeaning, and demoralizing,116 and 
scholars have found that teacher bullying is not only demoralizing, 
but also affects the ability of teachers to teach their students.117 
Further, although school administrators do not always teach classes, 
their ability to effectively lead the school is affected by bullying 
directed towards them and other staff members. The J.S. dissent 
acknowledged that “[b]roadcasting a personal attack against a school 
official . . . not only causes psychological harm to the targeted 
individuals but also undermines the authority of the school,”118 and 
that “[i]nsubordinate speech always interrupts the educational 
process . . . [;] [f]ailing to take action . . . would not only encourage 
the offending student to repeat the conduct, but also would serve to 
foster an attitude of disrespect towards teachers and staff.”119 The 
J.S. dissent concluded that the majority’s decision left schools 
“powerless to discipline students for the consequences of their 
actions,”120 and had “unwisely tipped the balance struck by Tinker, 
Fraser, Kuhlmeier and Morse, thereby jeopardizing schools’ ability to 
maintain an orderly learning environment.”121 
In addition, scholars have found that both “[t]eachers and other 
school staff members who experience . . . abusive interactions with 
students” are not only at risk for “impaired . . . performance” but 
also for leaving the profession.122 The J.S. dissent recognized that 
 
 114. Id. at 923. 
 115. Id. at 933. 
 116. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 209 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 117. Espelage et al., supra note 88, at 77. 
 118. J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (Fisher, J., 
dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 945 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. at 941 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 121. Id. at 952 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 122. Anne Gregory et al., Teacher Safety and Authoritative School Climate in High Schools, 
118 AM. J. OF EDUC. 401, 401 (asserting that teacher victimization therefore contributes “to 
the high national rates of . . . attrition”). 
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“[t]his kind of harassment has tangible effects on educators. It may 
cause [them] to leave the school and stop teaching altogether.”123 
Precedent that leads to impaired teacher performance, undermines 
school authority, and contributes to attrition cheats parents, 
students, and the community, who have already traded numerous 
rights to receive the benefits of a public education, including a 
supportive atmosphere of civility and order. 
Notably, had either of these profiles been circulated on paper at 
school, they absolutely could have been regulated under Fraser 
because they were lewd and vulgar, or possibly under Tinker because 
paper copies of the profile could likely not have been circulated 
without creating a substantial disruption. Ironically, the Third 
Circuit earlier noted this tension between regulating cyber and 
traditional bullying. In a school speech case decided prior to Layshock 
and J.S., the Third Circuit found a student’s off-campus internet 
speech unprotected when she referred to school administrators as 
“douchebags” and stated that had the student “distributed her 
electronic posting as a handbill on school grounds, this case would 
fall squarely within the Supreme Court’s precedents” holding that 
“offensive forms of expression may be prohibited.”124 
As serious as educational staff victimization is to learning, the 
more poignant rip-off to parents and students is when a student, 
rather than a principal, is on the receiving end of cyberbullying. In 
J.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School District, J.C. and several friends 
made a video in which they ridiculed fellow classmate C.C., calling 
her a “slut” and the “ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever seen in my whole 
life.”125 J.C. posted the video on YouTube and contacted C.C. and 
five to ten other students, encouraging them to view the video.126 
Later, a school counselor estimated that about half of the eighth 
grade eventually viewed the video.127 The next day, C.C. went to 
school with her mother, crying and telling administrators that she 
felt too humiliated to go to class.128 Although the district court 
determined the speech occurred off-campus, it cited a “long line of 
 
 123. J.S., 650 F.3d at 946 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 124. Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 125. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1098 
(C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 1120. 
 128. Id. 
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cases”129 that supported the “off-campus character [of the speech] 
does not necessarily insulate the student from school discipline,”130 
and that “Tinker applies to both on-campus and off-campus 
speech.”131 However, as in Layshock and J.S., the court concluded 
that under Tinker there was no substantial disruption to the school 
from the posting of J.C.’s video, so her speech was protected.132 The 
court did discuss Tinker’s “rights of others” prong, but felt 
insufficient authority existed to apply the prong to “speech that may 
cause some emotional harm to a student.”133 So, despite the harm to 
C.C. and her education, J.C. could not be punished. 
V. ENDING THE CYBERBULLYING RIP-OFF 
Some scholars have called for the Supreme Court to remedy the 
inadequacy of Tinker’s substantial disruption test in order to address 
cyberbullying.134 Unfortunately, the Court does not appear ready to 
issue any guidance soon.135 However, new precedent may not be 
necessary to end the cyberbullying rip-off if courts will apply Tinker’s 
“rights of others” prong, which allows schools to regulate speech 
that invades “the rights of other[s]. . . to be secure and to be let 
alone.”136 The Fourth Circuit recently used this prong in 
conjunction with the substantial disruption prong, and other circuits 
have suggested that the “rights of others” prong could stand alone 
in regulation of student speech.137 Circuits should allow the “rights 
of others” prong to stand alone to keep the school speech trade-off 
from shortchanging students and parents. 
 
 129. Id. at 1105. 
 130. Id. at 1106. 
 131. Id. at 1108. 
 132. Id. at 1120. 
 133. Id. at 1123. 
 134. Martha McCarthy, Commentary, Student Electronic Expression: Unanswered 
Questions Persist, 277 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 19 (2012) [hereinafter Unanswered Questions] (“[A] 
decision clarifying the reach of the First Amendment to student expression initiated off school 
grounds but accessible to the school community would be very helpful to school personnel.”). 
See generally Philip T.K. Daniel & Scott Greytak, Commentary, A Need to Sharpen the First 
Amendment Contours of Off-Campus Student Speech, 273 EDUC. L. REP. 21 (2011). 
 135. Three of the school speech cases discussed in this Comment were denied certiorari 
Jan, 17, 2012: Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
132 S. Ct. 1095 (2012); J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012); and Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1097 (2012). 
 136. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
 137. See discussion infra Part V.B.4. 
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A. Considering the Rights of Others with the Substantial Disruption 
Standard 
It is not clear why early courts addressing student Internet 
speech cases ignored the “rights of others” prong entirely.138 
Fortunately, the only two federal cases addressing student-on-
student cyber-bulling both mention it, although they treat the prong 
differently.139 In J.C., as mentioned above, the court found the 
prong inapplicable, but in Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, “the 
Fourth Circuit seemed to connect the two prongs in a novel way by 
reasoning that interference with the rights of others creates the 
disruption required to trigger Tinker’s exception.”140 Kowalski, a 
high school senior, created a MySpace discussion group after school 
on her home computer to ridicule another student, Shay N.141 She 
invited approximately 100 of her MySpace “friends” to join the 
group, entitled “S.A.S.H. (Students Against Shay’s Herpes).”142 The 
students, took turns making derogatory comments about Shay and 
posted pictures of her with an X across her crotch accompanied by 
the message, “Warning: Enter at your own risk.”143 Shay and her 
parents met with the vice principal the next day, filed a harassment 
complaint, and returned home.144 Kowalski was suspended from 
school for ten days and from social activities for ninety days.145 
The Fourth Circuit upheld the school’s discipline and 
determined that Tinker applied, quoting the entire two-prong test 
twice.146 As scholar Martha McCarthy noted, “In several places, the 
 
 138. Emmett v. Kent Sch. Dist., 92 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash. 2000); Beussink v. 
Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
 139. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 565; J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 
F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 140. Unanswered Questions, supra note 134, at 10. 
 141. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567. 
 142. Id. (“Kowalski claimed in her deposition that ‘S.A.S.H.’ was an acronym for 
‘Students Against Sluts Herpes,’ but a classmate, Ray Parsons, stated that it was an acronym for 
‘Students Against Shay’s Herpes.’”). 
 143. Id. at 568 (stating another posted picture of her was captioned, “portrait of a whore”). 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 568–69. Her school suspension was reduced to five days, but her social 
suspension was upheld, preventing her from participating on the cheerleading squad for the 
rest of the year and from crowning the school’s next “Queen of Charm” as she had been 
elected Queen the previous year. Id. at 569. 
 146. Id. at 571 (“[I]n Tinker . . . student speech . . . was protected because it did not 
‘materially and substantially interfer[e] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the 
operation of the school’ [or] collid[e] with the rights of others.”). 
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Fourth Circuit seemed to give credence to Tinker’s second prong as 
a viable exception to constitutional protection of student expression 
that collides with the rights of others.”147 The court stated that 
“[b]ecause the Internet-based bullying and harassment in this case 
could reasonably be expected to interfere with the rights of a student 
at Musselman High School and thus disrupt the school learning 
environment, Kowalski was indeed on notice that Mussel-man [sic] 
High School administrators could regulate and punish the conduct 
at issue here.”148 
Kowalski keeps with the broad reading of school speech 
precedent and prevents the cyberbullying rip-off by allowing schools 
to punish cyberbullies. However, this approach is not the most 
effective because tying the “rights of others” to “substantial 
disruption” may lead to disparate discipline against different 
cyberbullies depending on which victims they select. Kowalski 
allowed that invading Shay’s rights could create substantial 
disruption by focusing on how Shay had to miss school because of 
the harassment, and how, because classmates descended on Shay in a 
“pack,”149 potential existed for a “snowballing effect” of abuse.150 
This use of “substantial disruption” requires a court to consider the 
outward effects of cyberbullying on the victim in determining 
whether to uphold school discipline. This interpretation could 
encourage bullies to seek out victims who are less likely to seek help. 
Students who have little parental support, are already susceptible to 
depression, or are just afraid of retaliation from cyberbullies may hide 
how they are affected by cyberbullying, but cyberbullying of these 
victims could actually have the most tragic results.151 If courts can 
determine that cyberbullying itself collides with the rights of others 
and deserves discipline regardless of the victim’s reaction, only then 
have courts truly ended the cyberbully rip-off. 
 
 147. Unanswered Questions, supra note 134, at 10. 
 148. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 575–76 (emphasis added). 
 149. Id. at 576. 
 150. Id. at 574. 
 151. Cyberbullying-linked Suicides Rising Study Says, CBC NEWS (Oct. 20, 2012), 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/story/2012/10/19/cyberbullying-suicide-study.html 
(finding that “[t]here have been 41 suicides since 2003 involving cyberbullying in the United 
States, Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom”). 
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B. Letting the “Rights of Others” Prong Stand Alone 
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard falls short of addressing 
cyberbullying that targets students individually. In some cases of 
cyberbullying, educational disruption may only be felt by an 
individual, rather than throughout the school. Other 
commentators152 have also suggested that allowing the “rights of 
others” prong to stand alone is a viable solution to addressing cases 
of cyberbullying. Philip Daniel stated, “[t]hough the right of 
students to attend school free from psychological harm has rarely 
been discussed in courts, it presents a promising analytical framework 
for school personnel to wield against cyberbullies’ potential First 
Amendment claims.”153 Accordingly, the school district in J.S. seized 
upon the “rights of others” prong to justify its regulation of J.S.’s 
cyber speech.154 But, as discussed above, the court did not accept 
this argument and found against the school. As in J.S., courts have 
been hesitant to apply the second prong of Tinker alone, presumably 
because there is little case law defining the standard.155 
The balance of this Part argues that allowing the “rights of 
others” prong to alone justify the regulation of school speech is 
supported by Supreme Court and circuit precedent and that a usable 
definition of the “rights of others” is not impossible to craft. Support 
for the independent use of the “rights of others” prong can be found 
in the Tinker text itself, the circuit cases relied upon to create the 
Tinker test, Tinker analysis in past Supreme Court school speech 
cases, and reasoning by other circuits. Together, these sources 
provide ample support for lower courts to allow school regulation of 
student speech under the “rights of others” prong of the Tinker test. 
 
 152. E.g., Joe Dryden, It’s a Matter of Life and Death: Judicial Support for School 
Authority over Off-Campus Student Cyber Bullying and Harassment, 33 U. LA VERNE L. REV. 
171 (2012); Martha McCarthy, Curtailing Degrading Student Expression: Is a Link to 
Disruption Required?, 38 J. L. & EDUC. 607 (2009); Martha McCarthy, Student Expression 
that Collides with the Rights of Others: Should the Second Prong of Tinker Stand Alone?, 240 
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2009). 
 153. Philip T.K. Daniel, Commentary, Bullying and Cyberbullying in Schools: An Analysis 
of Student Free Expression, Zero Tolerance Policies, and State Anti-Harassment Legislation, 268 
EDUC. L. REP. 619, 632 (2011). 
 154. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 931 n.9 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
 155. J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1123 
(C.D. Cal. 2010) (“[T]he Court is not aware of any authority . . . that extends the Tinker 
rights of others prong so far . . . . This court declines to be the first.”). 
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Courts should act accordingly, allowing schools more tools to 
protect the trade-offs they require students to make. 
1. The stand-alone use of the “rights of others” prong is allowed by the 
text of Tinker 
The Tinker test is outlined several times in the opinion, always 
using the disjunctive “or” between the disruption prong and the 
“rights of others” prong. In the first articulation, the “rights of 
others” is mentioned twice: 
There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ interference, 
actual or nascent, with the schools’ work OR of collision of the 
rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone. Accordingly, 
this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon the 
work of the schools OR the rights of other students.156 
The standard is summarized in full at the end of the opinion: 
[C]onduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any 
reason—whether it stems from time, place or type of behavior—
materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder OR 
invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.157 
Although court opinions are not necessarily subject to the rules 
of statutory interpretation, it is prudent to assume that the holding 
of a case, “ought . . . to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, 
no clause, sentence, or word will be superfluous, void, nugatory, or 
insignificant.”158 This is particularly true when interpreting the 
critical provisions of the case where the Court is articulating a novel 
legal test. In a relatively short opinion,159 why would the majority 
repeatedly mention “the rights of others” as part of its disjunctive 
test if the phrase were to have no independent meaning? The best 
reading of the Tinker test would ascribe significance to each half of 
the Court’s disjunctive test—not merely to one of two clearly 
articulated prongs. 
 
 156. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) 
(emphasis and capitalization added). 
 157. Id. at 513 (emphasis and capitalization added). 
 158. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 433 (2012). 
 159. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 503–14. The majority opinion is only eleven pages long. 
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The Court does more than merely reference the “rights of 
others” in its articulations of the Tinker test. In fact, the Court 
discusses “the rights of others” five times. The Court found there was 
no evidence that the wearing of armbands was in “collision with the 
rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone,”160 nor that 
the armbands “impinge[d] upon the rights of other students.”161 
The Court affirmed that opinions expressed “without colliding with 
the rights of others”162 and without seeking “to intrude in the school 
affairs or the lives of others”163 were permissible but held that the 
“invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the 
[Constitution].”164 This discussion of the “rights of others” 
demonstrates that the Court felt that this prong of the test held 
meaning independent of the substantial disruption prong. A full and 
fair reading of the Tinker decision supports the use of each prong 
independently of the other. 
2. The “rights of others” test is supported by cases relied on by Tinker 
No Supreme Court precedent before Tinker predicted its 
outcome.165 In crafting the Tinker test, the Court relied instead 
upon decisions in two Fifth Circuit civil rights cases, Burnside v. 
Byars and Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education166 that 
involved student speech similar to that in Tinker. In Burnside v. 
Byars, black students at the all-black Booker T. Washington High 
School in Philadelphia, Mississippi, wore “freedom buttons” that 
included the phrase “One Man One Vote”167 to protest the denial of 
voting rights to black adults.168 Like the principal in Tinker, the 
black principal169 threatened to suspend any student who wore one 
of the buttons, fearing the buttons “would cause commotion, and 
 
 160. Id. at 508. 
 161. Id. at 509. 
 162. Id. at 513. 
 163. Id. at 514. 
 164. Id. at 513. 
 165. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1130 (“Looking at Supreme Court precedent alone, it 
would seem as though the Tinker tests were created out of whole cloth . . . .”). 
 166. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966); Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. 
of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 167. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746. 
 168. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1131. 
 169. Id. at 1136. 
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would be disturbing [to] the school program.”170 The district court 
shared the principal’s concern and upheld the school’s regulation.171 
These concerns were well warranted considering the volatile political 
climate in Mississippi at the time.172 The Fifth Circuit, however, 
determined that since there was “no interference with educational 
activity,” the students’ speech was protected.173 
In Blackwell v. Issaquena County Board of Education174 
consolidated with Burnside and decided on the same day by the same 
Fifth Circuit panel,175 students at the all-black Henry Weathers High 
School, in Rolling Fork, Mississippi, wore their freedom buttons to 
school.176 After their school’s black principal177 heard several students 
talking loudly in the hall when they should have been in class, he 
called an assembly and notified the students that if they continued 
wearing the buttons and disrupting school, they would be 
suspended.178 Throughout the week, many students were suspended 
and sent home. Some of those students returned to the school, tried 
to pin buttons on other students, and tried to get the non-suspended 
students to leave school too.179 At least one student who had been 
suspended entered a classroom during class to enlist other students 
in the cause, and some students threw the buttons into the building 
through the windows.180 The court upheld the school’s discipline 
because the students not only disrupted the school but also invaded 
the rights of others through their protest.181 
The disruption in Blackwell was clearly more substantial than in 
Burnside. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit could have used the 
 
 170. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 746–47 (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
 171. Id. at 746. 
 172. Bowman, supra note 42 at 1134–35. In the summer of 1964 President Lyndon B. 
Johnson had just signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and hundreds of civil rights volunteers, 
mainly from the North, flocked to the South to register black voters. Just six weeks earlier, the 
mutilated bodies of three of these voter registration volunteers—their story is featured in the 
movie MISSISSIPPI BURNING—were found in an earthen dam near Philadelphia, Mississippi. Id. 
 173. Burnside, 363 F.2d at 748. 
  174. Blackwell v. Issaquena Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). 
 175. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1141. 
 176. Blackwell, 363 F.2d  at 750. 
 177. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1139. 
 178. Blackwell, 363 F.2d at 750–51. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 752. 
 181. Id. at 754. 
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magnitude of the disruption alone to measure whether the students’ 
speech was protected. Instead, the court upheld the school’s 
discipline, not only because the student created a disruption, but 
because by doing so, they had shown “complete disregard for the 
rights of their fellow students.”182 The court repeated that the 
button-wearing students’ right to speak could not “[collide] with the 
rights of others.”183 
The Supreme Court could have adopted only the Burnside 
“substantial disruption” standard in crafting the Tinker test, and 
distinguished Blackwell by the disruption standard alone. In fact, 
early drafts of the majority opinion omit the mention of Burnside or 
Blackwell and “the rights of others” completely.184 However, after 
his law clerk Marcia Field185 wrote to Justice Fortas pointing out that 
the weighing of the rights of others was what distinguished Tinker 
and the fact-similar Burnside from Blackwell,186 this concept found 
its way into his majority opinion. Presumably, when Justice Fortas 
revised his Tinker opinion to include “the rights of others” prong 
from Blackwell with a disjunctive “or” after the “substantial 
disruption” prong, he meant to clarify that both speech that is 
substantially disruptive and speech that collided with the rights of 
others is not protected by the First Amendment. 
3. The “rights of others” prong is allowed by subsequent Supreme Court 
school speech rulings 
Subsequent Supreme Court opinions either articulate the entire 
two-prong Tinker test, or craft new rules after determining that 
Tinker does not apply. No subsequent precedent questions the 
validity of the “rights of others” prong. 
a. Fraser v. Bethel School District. Justice Burger’s majority 
opinion in Fraser addresses both prongs of Tinker.187 It does so by 
noting, first, that Fraser’s speech interfered with the work of school 
because “a highly appropriate function of public school education 
 
 182. Id. at 753. 
 183. Id. at 754. 
 184. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1161. 
 185. Id. at 1159 n.181. Field went on to teach at Harvard Law School and became the 
second woman to be awarded tenure there. Id. 
 186. Id. at 1161. 
 187. Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986). 
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[is] to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public 
discourse,”188 and, second, that Fraser’s speech intruded upon the 
rights of other students.189 The Court explained this second point: 
“By glorifying male sexuality . . . the speech was acutely insulting to 
teenage girl[s] . . . [and] could well be seriously damaging to its less 
mature audience, many of whom were only 14 years old.”190 This 
language clearly allows lower courts to consider the negative 
psychological effects of challenged speech on the rights of others in 
school when determining whether school regulation is 
constitutionally permissible. 
b. Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier. When this case was before the Eighth 
Circuit, the court ruled that a school newspaper could not be censored 
unless it met the Tinker test.191 In articulating the test, the Eighth Circuit 
applied both prongs of Tinker.192 Unfortunately, since the Tinker court 
did not explicitly elaborate on what the “invasion of the rights of 
others”193 entailed, the Eighth Circuit deferred to a student-written law 
review article on school newspapers194 that opined that “the rights of 
others” prong only referred to conduct that would open the school up to 
tort liability.195 When the Supreme Court reversed, it gave no credit to 
the Eighth Circuit’s Tinker analysis196 and fully articulated the two-prong 
Tinker test in its own opinion.197 Therefore, after Kuhlmeier, the Tinker 
standard stood unmodified as the Court left it in Fraser, neither 
expanding upon—nor, most importantly, limiting—the applicability of 
the “rights of others” prong. 
 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. (emphasis added). 
 191. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 265 (1988). 
 192. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1371 (8th Cir. 1986), rev’d 
sub nom. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 193. Id. at 1375 (“We must first determine what the Tinker Court meant by ‘invasion of 
the rights of others.’”). 
 194. Note, Administrative Regulation of the High School Press, 83 MICH. L. REV. 625 
(1984). 
 195. Kuhlmeier, 795 F.2d at 1375–76. 
 196. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 n.5 (“We therefore need not decide whether the Court 
of Appeals correctly construed Tinker as precluding school officials from censoring student 
speech to avoid ‘invasion of the rights of others,’ except where that speech could result in tort 
liability to the school.”). 
 197. Id. at 266 (“[Students] cannot be punished . . . unless school authorities have 
reason to believe that such expression will ‘substantially interfere with the work of the school 
or impinge upon the rights of other students.’”). 
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c. Morse v. Frederick. Although a reasonable reading of Fraser 
may reveal that it demonstrates a Tinker analysis,198 in Morse, Justice 
Roberts determined that the Tinker standard was not applied at all in 
Fraser.199 This led him to believe that the Tinker analysis was “not 
absolute.”200 However, in cases where the Supreme Court would 
find Tinker still applicable, nothing in Morse suggests that the second 
prong is not viable on its own. In addition, the dissent in Morse 
discussed the “rights of others” prong independently by arguing that 
there was no evidence that the “banner’s reference to drug 
paraphernalia willful[ly] infringed on anyone’s rights.”201 
4. The “rights of others” prong has been recognized by circuit courts 
As early as 1977, circuit courts recognized Tinker’s “rights of 
others” as a separate prong from the substantial disruption prong. In 
Trachtman v. Anker,202 the Second Circuit prevented a student 
newspaper staff from distributing an anonymous survey asking about 
students’ sexual behavior because under Tinker’s second prong it 
would “invade the rights of other students by subjecting them to 
psychological pressures which may engender significant emotional 
harm.”203 Even the plaintiffs did not argue that the school lacked 
authority to “protect the physical and psychological well being of 
students while they [were] on school grounds”; rather, they argued 
only that their right of expression in giving the survey outweighed 
this interest of other students who might be harmed.204 
Further, in spite of its decisions in J.S. and Layshock, the Third 
Circuit has formerly given credence to Tinker’s second prong. In 
Saxe v. State College Area School District, the Third Circuit found a 
school district’s policy that prohibited any speech creating an 
 
 198. Id. at 281–82 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) (“This Court 
applied the Tinker test just a term ago in Fraser . . . . Fraser faithfully applied Tinker.”). 
 199. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) (“Fraser . . . certainly did not 
conduct the ‘substantial disruption’ analysis prescribed in Tinker.”) The majority in Kuhlmeier 
agreed. “The dissent perceives no difference between the First Amendment analysis applied in 
Tinker and that applied in Fraser. We disagree.” 484 U.S. at 271 (majority opinion). 
 200. Morse, 551 U.S. at 405. 
 201. Id. at 440 (Stevens, Souter & Ginsberg, JJ., dissenting) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 202. Trachtman v. Anker , 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 203. Id. at 516. 
 204. Id. (emphasis added). 
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“intimidating, hostile or offensive environment” overbroad, but 
suggested that under Tinker’s second prong such a policy might be 
constitutional205 if it “require[d] [a] . . . threshold showing of 
severity or pervasiveness.”206 Later, the Third Circuit found in 
Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Regional Board of Education, that the 
school could regulate speech promoting racial hatred207 because of 
its likelihood to cause disruption, but that the school could not 
regulate speech that promoted general “ill-will.”208 The dissent 
argued that because “Tinker spoke not only in terms of disruption of 
school activities but in the disjunctive, interference with the rights of 
others,”209 that schools should also be able to restrict speech with 
“element[s] of enmity, spite, or improper purpose.”210 
In Harper v. Poway School District,211 the Ninth Circuit found 
that a student’s speech was unprotected solely under the “rights of 
others” prong212 when he refused to change his shirt containing a 
message condemning homosexuality during the school’s Day of 
Silence.213 The court reasoned that since most children attend public 
school214 and attendance is mandatory, students should be able to 
take advantage of their opportunity for an education free from 
physical and psychological attacks.215 
 
 205. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 217 (“[The school district] could 
argue that speech creating a ‘hostile environment’ may be banned because it ‘intrudes 
upon . . . the rights of other students.’”) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. 
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969)). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 208. Id. at 264–65. 
 209. Id. at 274 (Rosenn, J., dissenting in part). 
 210. Id. at 275 (Rosenn, J., dissenting in part). 
 211. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 
vacating as moot sub nom. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S. 1262 
(2007). 
 212. Id. at 1183 (“Although we, like the district court, rely on Tinker, we rely on a 
different provision—that schools may prohibit speech that ‘intrudes upon . . . the rights of 
other students.’”). 
 213. Id. at 1171. Poway High School allowed the student Gay-Straight Alliance to 
organize a Day of Silence to “teach tolerance of others.” Id. 
 214. Id. at 1176. 
 215. Id. at 1178. 
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C. Definitional Problems with the Rights of Others 
A legitimate hesitation to using the “rights of others” prong is 
the concern over the lack of a sufficiently narrow definition.216 
Courts and scholars have proposed two theories: (1) a right to be 
free from torts, and (2) a right to be free from psychological harm. 
Although the right to be free from torts is an attractive interpretation 
because it is an easily definable bright-line rule, it adds no additional 
protection to parents, students, or schools because it only allows 
schools to regulate student speech that they can already regulate 
under existing First Amendment doctrines. In contrast, a right to be 
free from psychological harm, appropriately limited, not only offers 
students a benefit in the speech rights trade-off, but also aligns with 
the Supreme Court’s use of the Blackwell precedent and subsequent 
circuit cases. 
1. A right to be free from torts 
Upon finding no disruption to the school under Tinker’s first 
prong, the Eighth Circuit in Kuhlmeier applied Tinker’s second 
prong and made one of the first explicit efforts to define the “rights 
of others.” Although it noted the second prong analysis from 
Trachtman, it was more persuaded by a student law review note on 
school newspapers that stated “[l]imiting school action under the 
invasion-of-rights justification to torts or potential torts means that a 
school can refer to previously defined legal standards to decide if it 
may constitutionally restrain student expression.”217 The court 
reasoned that “[a]ny yardstick less exacting than potential tort 
liability could result in school officials curtailing speech at the 
slightest fear of disturbance.”218 This argument is unpersuasive 
because the Supreme Court has since made it clear in both 
Kuhlmeier and Morse that schools can curtail some student speech 
 
 216. Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A Comprehensive Approach, 
63 FLA. L. REV. 395, 421 (2011) (“Tinker’s interference with the rights of others prong might 
eliminate all student First Amendment speech rights. After all, other students arguably have a 
right not to be captive to unwanted speech.”). 
 217. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1375–76 (8th Cir. 1986), 
rev’d sub nom. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 218. Id. at 1376. 
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that does not meet Tinker’s substantial disruption prong, even if it 
does not result in potential tort liability for the school.219 
The dissent in Harper adopted a similar position to the Eighth 
Circuit, arguing that “[t]he ‘rights of others’ language in Tinker can 
only refer to traditional rights, such as those against assault, 
defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose 
interplay with the First Amendment is well established.”220 The 
dissent feared that any broader definition would allow “the First 
Amendment rights of students [to be defined] out of existence.”221 
As discussed below, a definition of the “rights of others” can be 
crafted that both protects victims of cyberbullying and preserves First 
Amendment rights for students. 
A workable definition of the “rights of others” would not only 
preserve First Amendment rights of students, but as part of the 
ongoing school speech trade-off, would also provide additional 
benefits to students. The “rights of others” definition to be free of 
torts does not accomplish this. Schools can already, under Tinker or 
other First Amendment precedent, restrict student speech that 
threatens unlawful activity.222 To say that “the rights of others” 
means nothing more than to allow schools to regulate speech already 
under their control makes the prong unnecessary. 
2. Right to be free from psychological harm 
Schools should be able to use “rights of others” prong to restrict 
cyberbullying because restricting harmful student speech gives public 
school students the benefit of being free from psychological harm, a 
 
 219. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (permitting regulation of 
speech related to legitimate pedagogical interests); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) 
(permitting regulation of speech promoting illegal drug use). 
 220. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1198 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. 
granted, vacating as moot sub nom. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 
U.S. 1262 (2007) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (holding incitement to 
imminent lawless behavior unprotected); Wisniewski ex rel. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 
F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[W]e think that [under Tinker] school officials have significantly 
broader authority to sanction student speech [urging violent conduct] than the Watts standard 
allows.”); D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (Ct. App. 2010) (determining that the violent 
and threatening nature of cyberbullying was a “true threat” and not protected under the First 
Amendment). See also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 439 (2007) (Stevens, Souter & 
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (quoting Fraser and arguing “that our rigid imminence requirement 
ought to be relaxed at schools”). 
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benefit they would not have outside of the school setting. As 
discussed below, a workable definition of the “rights of others” 
distilled from case law includes the right to be free from 
intimidation, humiliation, or harassment that is severe or pervasive. 
An understanding of the historical context of Blackwell, where 
the phrase “the rights of others” originates, suggests that one 
meaning of the phrase was to allow students to be free from 
intimidation. Given the setting of Blackwell—a voting rights protest 
at an all-black segregated high school at the heart of racial violence 
in Mississippi in 1965223—students afraid of the repercussions of 
wearing a button224 likely felt intimidated by other students. The 
enemy of the right to vote was not inside the high school,225 but in 
the community at large.226 Therefore, the non-protesting students’ 
right to be let alone would include being free from the psychological 
harm of intimidation resulting from the protestors’ coercive actions. 
In Trachtman, the proposed student survey hoped to solicit 
responses from students about “pre-marital sex, contraception, 
homosexuality, masturbation and the extent of students’ ‘sexual 
experience.’”227 However, it was not designed to “guarantee the 
anonymity of those who answered.”228 Arguably, for both teens who 
were sexually experienced and those who were not, the possibility 
that such information could be individually identified and shared at 
school likely would have caused humiliation resulting in 
 
 223. Bowman, supra note 42, at 1137–38. In addition to the murder of the three voting 
rights volunteers near Philadelphia, Mississippi, the site of the Burnside case, Rolling Fork, the 
site of the Blackwell case was also geographically sandwiched between two hotbeds of racial 
violence: the city of McComb, where fifteen racially motivated bombings had recently 
occurred, was 150 miles to the south, and Selma, Alabama was 300 miles to the north where, 
the day after the students in Blackwell wore their buttons, Martin Luther King Jr. was arrested 
with 300 other protestors because the town refused to register black voters. Id. 
 224. Id. at 1136 (suggesting that had the principal allowed the wearing of the buttons, 
“the reaction from the African-American community probably would have been privately 
mixed, but publicly quiet. And, the White community likely would have reacted with hostility 
at best and violence visited upon the principal and his family at worst”). 
 225. Id. at 1140 (arguing that the principal likely attempted to prevent students from 
wearing their buttons because they “faced potentially violent retaliation from the local White 
community”). 
 226. Id. at 1134. The Council of Federated Organizations estimated that in retaliation 
for the voting rights drive in Mississippi in 1964 there were over 1000 arrests, 65 burned or 
bombed buildings, and at least 6 murders. Id. 
 227. Trachtman v. Anker , 563 F.2d 512, 515 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 228. Id. 
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“considerable anxiety and tension.”229 Students should be free from 
humiliation at school that results from public sharing of information 
that will hold them up to ridicule. 
Like the Second Circuit in Trachtman, the Ninth Circuit in 
Harper “unequivocally reject[ed]” the argument that the “rights of 
others” only referred to the right to be free from physical 
confrontation,230 and defined “the rights of others” instead as 
freedom from harassment. The majority argued that although name-
calling is constitutionally protected outside of school, “students 
cannot hide behind the First Amendment to protect their ‘right’ to 
abuse and intimidate other students at school.”231 Further, school 
administrators need not “tolerate verbal assaults that may destroy the 
self-esteem of . . . teenagers and interfere with their educational 
development.”232 
In order to provide that the definition of the “rights of others” 
does not sweep in otherwise protected speech, the severity or 
pervasiveness of the intimidation, humiliation, or harassment should 
be examined, as advocated in Saxe,233 to determine if it rises to the 
level of cyberbullying. Therefore, an effective test to determine if 
Tinker’s “rights of others” has been violated would consist of two 
steps: first, whether the speech involved intimidation, humiliation, 
and harassment; and second, whether such behavior met a 
“threshold showing of severity and pervasiveness.”234 If the speech 
qualifies under both steps, it is not protected. Under this definition, 
the speech in J.S., Layshock, J.C., and Kowalski would not have been 
protected since it was humiliating, harassing, and severe. In J.C. and 
Kowalski, the speech was also clearly intimidating since neither girl 
wanted to return to school as a result of the ridicule. This definition, 
with its limiting threshold, would not open students up to discipline 
 
 229. Id. at 518. 
 230. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. 
granted, vacating as moot sub nom. Harper ex rel. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 
U.S. 1262 (2007) (acknowledging Harper’s interpretation of Blackwell where he concludes 
that the accosting of other students was the only instance of a collision with the rights of 
others). 
 231. Id. (quoting Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d 
Cir. 2002)). 
 232. Id. at 1179. 
 233. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
 234. See supra notes 205–06 and accompanying text. 
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for “simple acts of teasing or name-calling” or grant students an 
“affirmative right not to be offended.”235 Instead, it would give 
school administrators,236 guided by elected school boards, and 
supported by parents, the tools and flexibility to end the 
cyberbullying rip-off. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Schools’ inability to address cyberbullying has created a rip-off 
for schools and students where speech that otherwise could be 
restricted as part of the public school trade-off237 is allowed because 
its covert nature defies Tinker’s substantial disruption test. Using the 
“rights of others” standard from Tinker is more consistent with how 
school speech precedent has evolved, the text from Tinker itself, and 
subsequent Supreme Court and circuit cases. Schools should be able 
to regulate cyberbullying when it invades the rights of other students 
to be free from intimidation, humiliation, and harassment provided 
the invasion is sufficiently severe and pervasive. This both preserves 
the balance of the public school trade-off, and sends a message that, 
“[t]here is no constitutional right to be a bully.”238 






 235. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (quoting Davis v. Monroe 
Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 652 (1999)). 
 236. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985) (“The promulgation of a rule 
forbidding specified conduct presumably reflects a judgment on the part of school officials that 
such conduct is destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment. Absent any 
suggestion that the rule violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should, 
as a general matter, defer to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between 
rules that are important to the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not.”). 
 237. See Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist. 650 F.3d 205, 222 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., 
concurring) (“[A]ny claimed right to spread scurrilous falsehoods about school administrators 
may well be outweighed by society’s legitimate interest in the orderly administration of public 
schools.”). 
 238. Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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